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]l(j PARKER "/J, \Vo;>tACK 
her Bnt in accordance with the 
rules of law the order may not be disturbed. 
The order is affirnwd. 
Gibson, C . .J., Edmonds, ,J., Carter, 
.L, and Spenee, ,J., eoneurred. 
laid ion for a rdt(·aring 
A. :\o. :21H.f:.l. In Bauk. 1fay H, 1\J.il.] 
lAlltE'l"l'1\ MAY P AHKKR, Hespondent, 
WOMACK et aL, Appellants. 
HOY A 
[1] Negligence-Inevitable or Unavoidable Accident.-The term8 
inevitable or unavoidable accident signify an injury caused 
by something other than the actionable negligence of the 
partie~, and iudude o11e caused by vis major, oe by an ab~ence 
of exceptional foresight, skill or care which the law does not 
expect of the ordinarily prudent man. 
[2] !d.-Inevitable or Unavoidable Accident.-N o redress is af-
forded for an injury caused by an inevitable or unavoidable 
accident, and the loss must be borne by the one upon whom 
it falls. 
[3] !d.-Inevitable or Unavoidable Accident.-The so-called de-
fense of inevitable accident is nothing more than a denial by 
defendant of negligence or a contention that his negligence, 
if any, was not the proximate cause of the injury. 
[4] Id.-Pleading.-The so-called dPfeuse of inevitable accident 
need not be specially pleaded hut is raised by a general 
denial of negligence. 
[5] !d.-Defenses-Unavoidable Accident.-The so-called defense 
of unavoidable accident is not limited to cases which include 
affirmative evidence that the aecident was proximately caused 
by circumstances beyond the control of an ordinarily prudent 
perwn, since the dominant consideration in dealing with 
unavoidable accident is the requirement that plaintiff make 
out his case by preponderance of all evid<mce regardless of 
when or by whom it was introduced, and if an accident 1:s 
[2] See 19 Cal.Jur. 545; 38 Am.Jur. 648. 
McK. Dig. References: [ 1-3] ~ egligence, § 1; [ 4] Negligence, 
§ 113; [5] Negligenee, § 5; [6, 9] Automobiles,§ 307(17); [7] Neg-
ligt>nce, ~190; [8] Automobiles, ~385-1; (10,11] New Trial, §124. 
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been inevitable or unavoidable that is equivalent 
that defendant was not negligent or that his 
did not cause the accident, nnd plaintiff has thereby 
failed in his proof. 
Automobiles-Instructions-Unavoidable Accident.-It is not 
io instrnet o!l unavoidable arcident in an automobile 
notwithstanding dPfendants fnil to introduce 
evwenee that the collision was cau;.;ed by something that 
defendant driver eould not ha1·e an1ided hy exercise of reason-
;lble enre, sinee defl•wlauts han no burdPn of defending a 
nf JWgligcuee with aftlrmatin; proof of an unavoidable 
ne~id<"nL 
Negligence-Instructions--Unavoidable Accident.- -ThP giving 
of :111 instnwtion on unavoi<lahlc nceident is not rendered 
improper by any tl•JH1Pm'y it might have to divert jurors from 
the d('Ei,.,in is sur$, or to permit defPndants to escape liability 
for sonw renson other ih:m their freedom from negligence or 
plaintiff's contributory negligenc<', sinee a determination that 
nn aecidPnt was unavoidable is propPr not only under evidencP 
that it was caused by ris major, but whPre evidenee shows 
plaintiff has failed in his proof. 
l8] Automobiles-- Appeal- Harmless Error- Instructions.-Jn-
strueting· in an automobile collision case on unavoidable 
Hccident at defPndant's Tl'(/tH~st cannot he said to be harmful 
1 o plaintiff, since plaintiff, in any event, has the burden of 
proving- the collision wns ocensiorwd sol(•ly hy defendant's 
IH'gligenee. 
j9j !d.-Instructions-Unavoidable Accident.---Tn an automobile 
intersection collision case, dPfendants arc 1mtitled to an in-
~truction on unavoidahk ;wcidrnt, where no rlaim is madP 
that rltd'end11nt driYrr IHt~ twgligent as a mattrr of Jaw, and 
wlwre the evidenrP is sueh as to rPquire the jury to decide 
which, if rither, drivPr fniled to use due carp in entering 
the intersection. 
1101 New Trial-Errors Relating to Instructions-Discretion-
Review.----GPnernll.l· thP dPtennination as to whether an er-
ronpous instrurtion was prejucli<·ial and ;justiflrs granting of 
a new trial is left to the trial court's discretion, and where a 
motion is granted upon that ground, the order will not be 
disturbed unless it appears that there has herm an abuse of 
that diseretion: hut when no error has been committed, there 
no hasis for the pxereisr of diseretion. 
Id.-Errors Relating to Instructions-Absence of Error.~­
\Vhere a new trial has be<'n granted beeause of a correct in-
~trurtion whi0h thr !'onrt Rhonld havP g-ivPn, and did givr, 
Sre 20 Oal.Jur. 139; ;)!) Am.Jur. 127. 
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there is no basis for exPreise of matter 
of law there is no lPgal ground upon which a new trial nwy 
be ordered. (Code Civ. Proc., ~ G:i7(7).) 
APPEAL from an on1rr of the 
Angelrs County ~Tanting a nrw trinL 
Heversrd. 
Conrt of IJOR 
lt'red Miller, ,J ndge. 
Action for dnmages for suffered ht nn 
eollision. Order granting plnintiff a new trial, reversrrl. 
Ball, Hunt & Hart and Clarence S. Ilnnt for 
Delmar vY. Doddriuge for Respondent. 
EDMONDS, J.--Loretta May Parker is suing for damages 
assertedly caused by the negligent operation of an automobile 
driven by Carl ·womack. At the request of vVomack, the jury 
vvas instructed that no recovrry could be had if the accident 
were an unavoidable one. After the entry of judgment for 
Womack, a new trial was granted upon the ground that the 
instruction was prejudicially erroneous. The only question 
presented upou the appeal from that order concerns the 
propriety of the instruction. 
Mrs. Parker alleged that she was driving her automobile in 
a northerly direction along l<Jarl Avenue when it collided with 
one owned by Hoy Womack and being driven in a negligent 
manner, vvesterly along 25th Street, by Carl ·womack. The 
answer denied all negligence and pleaded that Mrs. Parker 
had been guilty of contributory negligence. 
Each of the streets is 36 feet wide, with no marked center 
line. There were no traffic signs at the intersection. A honsP. 
trees, and other objects on the southeast corner obstructed thP 
view of one traveling from rast to west and also that of a 
northbound driver. 
1\frs. Parker was familiar with the intersection. Tn describ-
ing it, she testified that a driver traveling north on Earl A V0-
nne could not see traffic on 25th Street which was approaching 
from the east until the front of his automobile wns approxi-
mately one foot north of the south curb line. 
According to Mrs. Parker, in approaching 25th Street, 
when 5 or 6 feet from the intersection she decreased the speed 
of her car to less than 12 miles per hour and shifted into first 
gear. She looked to the west and, when her car was a foot or 
PARKER v. vVolV!ACK 
[37 C.2d 116; 230 P.2d 823] 
119 
into the• intersrction, lool;;ed to the east. She saw a west-
hound car approximatPly 75 or 100 feet from Earl A venue, 
but formed no opinion as to its speed. She proceeded into the 
interseetion at approximately the same speed, and did not 
observe this vehiele until it was direetly in front of her 
aud about one foot away. 
Hoy Womack owned the westbound car, which was being 
drivel! with his consent by Carl ·womack. Five other young 
wer<> in it. Carl testified that he had stopped his car at 
American A venue, one block east of Earl A venue. As he 
related the details concerning his operation of the automobile, 
after crossing American A venue, he increased the speed to 
approximately 30 miles per hour, reducing it to 20 miles 
per honr as he reached the intersection where the accident 
()~<:urred. 
Continuing his testimony, Carl said that, although his view 
to the south on Earl Avenue was obstructed, at a point 100 
feet east of the intersection he believed he could see traffic 
within 20 or 30 feet of 25th Street. When 50 feet or less from 
the intersection, he looked to the south, but saw no automobiles. 
As he entered the intersection, he looked to the north. He 
then turnPd to look to the south, and saw the Parker automo-
bile "a couple of seconds" before the collision. At this time, 
tlw front of his automobile was more than 6 feet into the inter-
section and the Parker ear >vas 6 or 7 feet south of the center 
of 26th Street. He did not apply the brakes. 
'rhe impact occurred in the northeast quadrant of the inter-
section, approximately 16 feet south of the north curb line of 
25th Strert and 10% feet west of the east curb line of Earl 
A venue. A reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the evi-
dence regarding the damage to the vehicles is that the Parker 
automobile struck the side of the onr driven b~· vYornack at 
approximately its center. 
Passengers in the Womack automobile testified that they 
were traveling approximately 20 miles per hour when entering 
the intersection. One of them estimated that when she first 
saw the Parker automobile, it was traveling at a speed of 20 
miles per hour. Both vehicles, the witness ~aid, were then in 
the intersection and an equal distance from the center of it. 
Upon this evidence, the jury returned a verdict in favor of 
the vVomacks. Mrs. Parker then moved for a new trial upon 
Hine grounds. However, her points and authorities in support 
of the motion, and the argument at the hearing of it, were 
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limited to the sole point that the court erred in instructing the 
jury as follows: ''In law v:e what is termed an 11ll· 
avoidable or inevitable accident. These terms do not mean 
literally that it was not possible for such an accident to be 
avoided. 'l'hey simply denote an accident that occurred with-
out having been proximately caused by negligence. Even if 
such an accident could have been avoided by the exercise of 
<:xeeptional foresight, skill or caution, still, no one may be held 
I iable for injuries resulting from it.'' 
'fhe minute order which records the action of the court in 
granting the motion does not specify the ground upon which 
it was made. However, unquestionably the new trial was 
Mdcred because the trial judge concluded that he had erred in 
iustructing the jury regarding the rule of unavoidable 
aeeideut. 
lT pon the appeal from that order, the vVomacks contend that, 
as the issue of unavoidable accident is present in every case in 
which the defendant is not guilty as a matter of law, the chal-
lPuged instruction was proper. Mrs. Parker argues that there 
is no evidence justifying the giving of the instruction because 
all of the testimony shows the happening of an accident which 
would not have occurred except for the negligence of one or 
both of the drivers. 
[1] The terms inevitable or unavoidable accident signify 
an injury which is caused by something other than the action-
able negligence of the parties involved. 'l'he terms thus include 
one caused by vis major, ·which usually is defined as a greater or 
superior force, or an irresistible force. ''A loss by vis major is 
one that results immediately from a natural cause without the 
intervention of man, and could not have been prevented by 
the exercise of prudence, diligence and care.'' (Black's Law 
Dictionary.) 
[2] An accident which is caused by an absence of excep-
tl:onal foresight, skill or care which the law does not expect of 
the ordinarily prudent man is also characterized as inevitable 
or unavoidable. No redress is afforded for an injury caused 
by such an accident and the loss must be borne by the one upon 
vi' hom it falls. (38 Am.Jur. § 6, pp. 648, 649; 65 C.J.S. § 21, 
pp. 429-434; 1 Shearman & Redfield on ~egligence [rev.ed. 
1941], § 32, pp. 86-90.) [3] Otherwise stated, and incorpo-
rating both factors which relieve one from liability, an acci-
dent is inevitable or unavoidable when it is not proximately 
eaused by negligence. As recently defined by this conrt, 
''. . . the so-called defense of inevitable accident is nothing 
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or a contention 
was not the proximate cause of 
Los Angeles, 26 Cal.2d 519. 
[4] It need not be specially 
a denial of negligence. (Polk 
supra, at p. 542; Martindale v. Atchi-
89 Cal.App.2d 400 [201 P.2c1 ; 8iev-
47 225 [ 117 P.2d 717] ; 8chub-
:n Cal.App.2d 312 P.2d ; 8itlu;i v. 
25 Cal.A pp.2d 294, 298 !77 P.2d :111] ; 
!'rarer\'. Rlbe, 98 Cai.App. 101, 105 [27G P. 389].) 
Ppon a rPcrird which includes affirmatiw evidew·p 
prove an ac(•ident proximately caused by eircum-
the control of an ordinarily prndPnt per:-:on, an 
npon unavoidable accident has been held proper. 
of such situations are an unforeseen failure of 
brakes (Merry v. Knnclsen Creamery Co., 94 Cal.App.2d 7]5 
l P.2d 905] ; Alward v. Paola, 79 Cal.App.2d 1 [179 P.2d 
j l :the foot of an automobile driver becoming caught. between 
the brake and clnteh pedals (Zafcris v. Bradlrcy, 28 Cal.App.2d 
l R8 P .2d 70]) ; the sudden appearance of a horse 11pon the 
(Jolley v. Clemens, 28 Cal.App.2d 55 [82 P.2d 51!); 
and a child darting into the street (Creamer v. Cerrato, 1 
CaL\pp.2d 441 [36 P.2d 1094]; Graham v. Consolidated 
J!. T. 112 Cal.App. 6·18 [297 P. 617)). 
But the application of the rule allowing the defensr of 
lll1a,·oidable accident has not been limited to cases where the 
defendant relies upon evidence of a proximate cause beyond 
his eontrol. An instruction stating the law regarding thr- rigllt 
of a def~>ndant from exemption from liability because thr 
:w,·idPnt could not have been avoided has also been approved 
1\·lwrc there was no eYidence that it was caused by any factor 
,>J her than the Jack of eare. ''The dominating consid(•ration 
in dealing 1Yith the 11·hole subject of inevitable accident, ... 
llw elelllentary requirement that before a plaintiff can re-
cover he nmst make ont. his ease by the preponderance of all 
evidenc8 before the' eourt or jury regardless of the stagr of 
the m1se at wlli('.h it may have appeared or the particular 
wl10 introllw···d it. 'l'o do this in a negligence ease he 
ill!lst show I hat tlH· dr~feJ1dant was negligent and tlw negli-
!!'•'11('(' W<lR tlw proximate ea11se of the injnry eomp]ailte(l of. 
But if the rteciclent was ine1'itable or 11navoidable that 1·s the 
same thing as to say that the defendant was not negligent, or 
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that his negligence, if any, did not cause the acddent. In 
other words, 1·t is to say that the plaintiff has faUecl ·in his 
proof." (Jolley v. Clemens, 28 Cal.App.2d 55, 72, 73 
P.2d 51] ; cited with approval in Polk v. City of Los Angeles, 
snpra, at p. 543.) 
[6] lVIrs. Parker asserts that the challenged instrnetion 
should not have been given because no evidence of any kind 
was offered by Womack tending to prove that sometl1ing hap-
pened to cause the collision which he could not have avoided 
by the exercise of reasonable care. The argument erroneously 
assumes that the law imposed upon him the burden of defend-
ing a charge of negligeuce with affirmative proof of an un-
avoidable accident. The contrary is true. (Polk Y. Ct'ty of 
Los Angeles, supra, at p. 542.) 
[7] It is also suggested that wlwre the evidence is such as 
that shown by the record in this case, an instruction upon the 
doctrine of unavoidable accident is improper because it may 
tend to divert the minds of the jurors from thr decisive issues 
of the case; the defendant may escape liability beeansc of 
f:ome reason other than his freedom from negligence or the 
contributory negligence of the plaintiff. The contention might 
have some merit if the term "unavoidable accident" were 
limited to include only one caused by vis ma,jor. But a 
determination that au accident was unavoidable is also proper 
where the evidence merely shows " ... that the plaintiff haR 
failed in his proof." ( J alley v. Clemens, supra, at p. 73.) 
[8] -where an instruction defining such an accident is given 
at the request of the defendant, it cannot be said to have been 
harmful to the plaintiff "who in any event had the burden of 
proving that the collision was occasioned solely by the negli-
gence of the . . . [defendant] which, of course, would ex-
elude unavoidable accident." (Pearce v. Elbe, supra, at p. 
106.) 
In Hyman v. Market Street Ry. Co .. 41 Cal. App.2d 647 
1107 P.2d 485], and Scanclalis v . .Jenney, 132 Cal.App. 307 
[22 P.2d 545], it was lwld that the giving of an instruction 
concerning the rule of unavoidable accident ·was prejudicially 
rrroneous. However, in each of these cases, the evidence 
established the negligence of the defendant as a matter of 
law. Under the evidence there was no question of negligence 
for the jury to decide. [9] Here no claim is made that 
'Womack was negligent as a matter of law. Upon the evidence 
it was the duty of the jury to decide which, if either, of the 
drivers failed to use due case in entering the intersection 
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vVomacks were entitled to have the jury instructed 
to the rule of unavoidable accident. 
(10] As a general proposition, the determination as to 
an erroneous instruction was prejudicial and justifies 
of a new trial is one which is left to the trial 
discretion, and where a motion is granted upon that 
the order will not be disturbed unless it appears that 
there has been an abuse of that discretion. However, when 
JJO error has been committed, there is no basis for the exercise 
discretion. The statutory ground for granting a new 
bet·ause of the charge to the jury is that there has 
been au " ... error in law, occurring at the trial. ... " 
Code Civ. Proe., § 657, suhd. 7.) [11] It follows that 
as in the present case, a new trial has been granted 
becaUS(' of a correct instruction which the court should have 
and was given, there is no basis for the exercise of 
dis..:rd,ion. Under such circumstances, as a matter of law, 
there is no legal ground upon which a new trial may be 
ordered. (irioran v. Abbey, 63 Cal. 56.) 
The order is reversed. 
Gibson, C. ,J., 'l'raynor, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, .J., 
.~oneurred. 
CAR'rEii, J.-1 dissent. 'l'he instruction on unavoidable 
accident should not have been given and the order granting a 
new trial should be affirmed on that ground. 
The majority opinion states that, with relation to the evi-
dence introduced in this case, an instruction on unavoidable 
accident is not improper because "the defense of unavoidable 
aecideut has not been limited to cases where the defendant 
relies upon evidence of a proximate cause beyond his control"; 
that "an accident is inevitable or unavoidable when it is not 
proximately eaused by negligence.'' This argument proves 
too much. If an instruction on unavoidable accident does not 
add anything to instructions covering negligence, proximate 
eause, and the burden of proving those matters, there is no 
reason to g-ive such an instruction (as pointed out in Barr v. 
HaU, 12 CaLApp.2d 489, at 492 [55 P.2d 1246] ), and that 
iHstruction is improper at least where, as here, the jury is not 
clearly advised that the subjects covered by the other specific 
instructions are being repeated in a general and abstract 
manner. rl'he definition included in the questioned instruction 
]24 
--~that the terms unavoidable inevitable 
denote an accident that occurred without been 
caused by ''-ah;o shows that the 
is not appropriate to this case. All the evidence here tends to 
establish that the collision was caused negli-
gence of one or both of the drivers. The effect of the instruc-
tion is to into the case a third element not 
the of and 
negligence. 
In Polk v. City Los 26 CaL2d 519 [159 P.2d 
!J31j, and Jolley,.. 28 Cal.App.2d 55 P.2d 51], 
the drfendants qnestioned the propriety of instructions stating 
that the burden of proving that an accident was unavoidable 
r<>sted npon the defendants and the statements in those cases 
eoueerning unavoidable accident were addressed to that ques-
tion. Moreover, the statement that a finding of unavoidable 
accident merely means that the plaintiff has failed to prove 
his ease, further illustrates that an instruction on that matter 
is wholly unnecessary and is confusing in cases such as the 
present one. 
Hyman v. Market Street Ry. Co., 41 Cal.App.2d 647 [107 
P .2d 485], is an analogous case in that the evidence therein 
indicated that negligence of one (or perhaps both) of the 
defendants proximately caused the accident. There the 
plaintiff, while a passenger on a streetcar owned and oper-
ated by one defendant, was injured by a collision with another 
str-eetear owned and operated by the other defendant. It 
was held that the giving of an instruction on unavoidable 
aeeident was prejudieial error since there was no evidence of 
unavoidability. The majority opinion attempts to distinguish 
this case on the gTound that "the evidence established the 
negligence of the defendant as a matter of law." But it is 
apparent from the following statement of the facts that both 
defendants were not negligent as a matter of law: "The 
motorman of each car testified that his car was at a complete 
stop when the other ear ran into it. Passengers on each ear 
eorroborated the story of the motorman of their car." ( 41 
Cal.App.2d at p. 648.) Had the doctrine announced in the 
majority opinion been adopted, it would have been held that 
the jury could have found that either of the defendants was 
free from fault and that therefore the accident was unavoid-
able as to such defendant. 
In any event, we are not here concerned with whether or not 
the giving of the instruction would have required a reversal of 
the collision was una:void~ 
; v. 
; Martindale v. 
"'"hHJ.UU 400 {201. 
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''In the following cases the instruction was held proper 
where there was evidence that the accident was unavoidable. 
(Oraham v. Consolidated M. T. Co., 112 CaLApp. 648 [297 
P. 617] (child ran into street) ; Creamer Cerrato, 1 Cal. 
App.2d 441 [36 P.2d 1094] (same); Jolley v. Clernens, 28 Cal. 
App.2d 55 [82 P.2d 51] (horse suddenly appeared on high-
way); Zaferis v. Bradley, 28 Cal.App.2d 188 P.2d 70] 
(driYer's foot beeame wedged between pedals); Smith v. 
Harger, 84 CaLApp.2d 361 [191 P.2d 25] (small boy pushing-
on baek of dump truck); Jlerr-y v. Knudsen C1·eamer-y Co .. 
94 Cal.App.2d 715 r211 P.2d 905] (brake failure) 
"In Jacques v. Sotdhcr-n Pac. Co., 8 Cal.App.2d 738 [4R 
P.2d 63], Barr v.lfall, 12 Cal.App.2d 489, 492 [55 P.2d 12461, 
and D'Avanzo v. Manno, 16 Cal.App.2d 346 [60 P.2d 524], 
it was held proper to refuse the instruction where there was no 
evidence that would have supported a finding of nnavoidablP 
accident. In Jacques v. Southern Pac. Co., snpra, the court 
said (p. 741): 'There was no evidence upon which this 
instruction could be based. All the evidcnce tended to support 
the respective theories of the two parties-one, that tlJC acci-
dent was due to the careless and negligent operat.ion of tJw 
train, the other, that it was due to respondent's negligence 
in running in front of the moving train. The evidence all 
tended to prove the respective theories-that the accident 
was not unavoidable but that it could have been avoided by 
the other party.' This statement fits our case precisely .. 
"In the present case, the instruction not only tended to 
divert the minds of the jurors from the decisive issues of 
negligence and contributory negligence, but suggested that 
under the evidence the defendants might be held blameless 
for some reason other than their freedom from negligenee or 
contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff. In view of 
the evidence we have stated we can conceive of no theory 
mH1er which the accident could have been found to be 
mwvoidable, unless it be that collisions at intersections, where 
the Yiews of thr driyers are obstructed, are bound to occur, 
and therefore may be deemed unavoidable. 'l'his would be a 
highly unrcasonable theory, but appellants have suggested 
no better one. They say: 'From the evidence adduced, the 
jury could have found that defendant Womack exercised 
reasonable eare in the eontrol of his automobile,' and also, 
'accepting plaintiff's version, it might well be, that a jury 
could conelude her conduct was not negligent.' Without 
comment on these statements, we add that the jury could not 
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have found both parties to lmve been free from 
Appellants' analysis of the evidence and their 
""'"·"'"' tend to emphasize the fact that the accident was 
not una voidable. 
'\\Thl're a new trial is granted for the reason that an 
,·noneow; instruetion ·was prejudicial to the rights of the 
, the order will not be reversed unless it can be 
that the ruling was an abuse of discretion. (Nance v. 
Vines, Inc., 44 Cal.App.2d 868 [113 P.2d 244]; 
v. California St. Cable Ry. Co., 73 Cal.App.2d 641 
: 167 P.2d 2:39]; Mazzotta v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., 25 Cal.2d 
165 P.2d~338l; Brown v. George Pepperdine Foundation, 
2::5 Cal.2d 256 [143 P.2d 929] ; Copley v. Putter, 93 Cal.App.2d 
4:58 [207 P.2d 876!; Jones v. Scurlock, 96 Cal.App.2d 201 
!214 P.2d 599j. 'l'he order granting a new trial was not an 
abuse of discretion, but, upon the contrary, was a proper one 
fo1· the court to make.'' 
For tlH' reasolls stated I would aft1rm the order granting a 
nl'w trial. 
Nhenk, ,J., concurred. 
(Sac. No. 0162. In Bank. :May S, 1951.] 
OEOHUI•~ E. J;'OO'I'E, Petitioner, v. 'l'HE S'l'A'l'B BAR OP 
GA l.;lFORN IA, Hespondent. 
Ill Attorneys-Disciplinary Proceedings-Acts Involving Moral 
Turpitude.--In proceedings for the suspension of an attorney, 
his opinion as to the probable outcome of a will contest which 
he was engaged to proseeute is immaterial, and does not justify 
his unauthorized stipulation dismissiug the contest and subse-
quent misrepresentations to his clients as to the pendency 
of the hearing thereon. 
!d.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Acts Justifying Suspension.-
The suspension of an attorney for nine months is warranted 
by the moral turpitude demonstrated by his unauthorized dis-
missal of a will contest and subsequent misrepresentation as 
to the pendency of the hearing until after the opportunity to 
eontest the will has passed, although his clients may have 
suffered no loss through his misconduct. 
11] See 3 Cal.Jur. 731; 9 Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1949 Rev.) 493. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Attorneys, § 141; [2] Attorneys, 
149( 4). 
